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A TRIAL JUDGE'S FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN
ADMINISTERING PROBATION*
EVEN those institutions designed to eliminate forbidden behavior are not
authorized in our society to pursue that goal by the most effective means avail-
able.1 Other societal goals are reflected in institutional limitations upon police,
prosecutors, courts, and treatment agencies, which restrict their effectiveness
in controlling crime. Such limitations include the set of formal rules of law
enforced by the judicial system, 2 and the scarcity of available resources neces-
sary to achieve society's competing goals.3 Among the goals incorporated in
the legal limitations are the community desire that vengeance be exacted from
the culpable 4-and only the culpable L-and the preservation of individual
immunity from state control.6
*United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548 (D. Mass. 1961), application for pre-
rogative writs denied sub norn. It re Callahan, 285 F2d 757 (1st Cir. 1960).
1. The most effective means to eliminate forbidden behavior would no doubt include
some of the measures of planned social control developed by totalitarian governments.
Their attempts to reduce the desire to commit crimes are not restricted to use of the in
terrorem effects of punishment but also utilize advertising, propaganda, education, and the
arts. Individuals are selected for special treatment on the basis of a belief that they are
more likely than others to commit forbidden behavior-and a number of individuals may
be incorporated into the treatment process by random measures. The individualized forms
of treatment involve extreme physical and psychological coercion. These means, however,
are utilized largely to discourage that behavior which the totalitarian state is most inter-
ested in eliminating: individuals are not brainwashed for arson, nor are cultural subgroups
exterminated to prevent robbery.
2. Rules of law are more than official recognition of the importance of certain social
goals; they are implementations of those goals by commands that public officials shall
respond in predetermined ways to certain fact situations. While courts have developed
great skill in retaining freedom of action within the system of precedent, to the extent that
the principle of "a government of laws, not of men" has effect, the individual decision-
maker is limited by the law in his decision on the wisdom or justice of any act. The re-
strictions that law imposes on administration reflect a social judgment that important
policies may best be furthered by such limitations on discretion.
3. While it is generally true that there are insufficient resources to satisfy all goals
and that most goal-oriented action is therefore inherently limited in its effectiveness, this
principle has especial meaning in the case of government-supported activities. Politically
sensitive legislatures are particularly aware that the sum of resources available is limited,
and the public allocation process reflects the competition of goals as much or more than
does the market.
4. Punishment may be deemed morally necessary even when nonpunitive treatment
would be more effective in preventing future crimes; the concern with wreaking vengeance
for the crime already committed interferes with effective control of future crime. "A non-
punitive theory of justice is concerned with past acts only so far as they are indicative of
future anti-social acts." Gausewitz, Considerations Basic to a New Penal Code, 11 Wis.
L. REv. 346, 386 (1946).
5. The insane person is held unable to commit a "crime," because he is thought to be
morally not blameworthy. Yet he may be dangerous and there may be great need to au-
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Within these limitations, crime control institutions are authorized to choose
among available alternatives in achieving their primary goal, the elimination
of forbidden behavior.7 While some institutions such as legislatures and police s
have few limitations on their selection of effective means, criminal courts in
most cases 9 are limited by the rule that even a demonstrably dangerous per-
son must be convicted of some past crime before treatment may be applied to
him.'0
thorize public agencies to treat or isolate him. The limitations of the "criminal" law are
supplemented by such "civil" procedures as commitment. For a discussion of the problems
underlying statutes requiring commitment of those found not guilty by reason of insanity,
see Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1355 (1961). To select efficiently those in need of special measures
to protect society, their dangerousness, or likelihood to commit forbidden acts, would be
determined as best possible, using all available information.
Why not simply provide that any conduct which indicates a socially dangerous per-
sonality shall subject one to an accusation of having committed the act and, if the
accusation be found true, to the appropriate treatment?
Gausewitz, supra note 4, at 373.
[W]e ought not base our judgment of the character of a criminal upon his criminal
conduct alone .... What a single instance of the criminal behavior has to teach us
should be implemented and tested by what can be discovered of the actor's physical
and psychical condition at the time of his act, of his past, and of the changes wrought
in him by the criminal experience itself.
Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 701, 1273
(1937). Cf. Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe
and America, 48 HARv. L. REv. 433 (1935).
The behavior indicating dangerousness might be completely different from that be-
havior which the state seeks to prevent.
6. It is generally thought that the body of law governing the criminal trial operates
to preserve the freedom from state control of the innocent rather than most effectively to
identify the criminal (recognizing that freedom from state control is a concept as relative
as is innocence). But see A. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage
in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
7. The single goal of eliminating criminal behavior incorporates those ends of criminal
law sometimes defined as deterrence, isolation, and rehabilitation, which are not independ-
ent goals of policy but means towards that common purpose. Criminal behavior is taken
to mean those overt acts forbidden by the state, given the requisite mental state when
necessary to make up the elements of the crime-it is assumed that it is behavior, rather
than mental state, which the state seeks to prevent.
8. The police may apply before conviction many, if not all, the sanctions available to
such more formal agencies as the court only after conviction. See generally DONNELLY,
GOLDSTEIN & ScHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW: PROBLEMS FOR DECISION IN THE PROMULGA-
TION, INVOCATION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF A LAW OF CRIMES (1961) ; J. Goldstein, Police
Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Adminis-
tration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
9. But see, e.g., Note, 70 YALE L.J. 966 (1961) (bail) ; Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1355 (1961)
(mandatory commitment after verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity).
10. If a demonstrably dangerous person may not be treated or isolated until after his
first crime, this "every dog gets one bite" theory introduces an inefficiency into the process
of achieving the goal of crime control.
The reason is the social interest in individual freedom and liberty. It is an important
end of the criminal law. Indeed, if one must choose between ends as primary or
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After conviction, the trial court is generally permitted discretion in select-
ing that available response considered most effective in controlling crime.1' If
a given selection transgresses one of the limitations enforced by appellate
courts, it will be reversed as an abuse of discretion. Though no alternative
within the range of permissible discretion will be reversed, the decision to
select any given permissible alternative may be evaluated 12 in terms of its
effect on the primary goal of crime control and its effect on other societal goals.
For purposes of such analysis, a "rational" decision by a sentencing judge is
defined as the selection from among available responses of the one which seems
most effective in controlling crime at the least sacrifice of other important
goals. 13
The selection by courts of effective crime control techniques requires at least
a working theory of human behavior. Isolation from the community, whether
by imprisonment, execution, or banishment, is a recognized theory of crime
inhibition. The notion that men act upon a calculation of relative pains and
pleasures continues to be reflected in the system of preannounced punishments
designed to exert a deterrent impact upon the potential criminal.14And judicial
attempt to prevent future criminal behavior by manipulating the convicted per-
son's social environment, reflects current understanding of the extent to which
an individual's behavior is affected by social influences, such as internalization
of group expectations concerning the choices among alternatives of behavior
and the definition of those alternatives by his social and economic roles. 15
secondary, it might be maintained that it is the primary end of the criminal law to
protect the individual from arbitrary acts on the part of public agents.
Gausewitz, supra note 4, at 374.
11. Constitutional and statutory rule sets certain outer limits on the form of punish-
ment, and the extent of a fine, term of imprisonment, or period of probation. The Federal
Probation Act, for example, limits probation to a period of five years, and also prohibits
its use for offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1958).
12. Evaluation of such exercises of discretion may be undertaken by appellate courts
through dicta which may serve as guides for lower courts while still allowing scope for
experimentation.
13. See WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 115-18 (Par-
sons ed. 1947).
14. A simplistic version of this theory envisages a type of criminal for whom only
deterrent punishment is an effective device, to the exclusion of attempts at manipulation
of social environment and cultural influences. Punishment, in such a view, would serve to
deter the thoughtful from the decision to commit crime.
[C]ertain persons ... coldly and deliberately choose a life of crime.., to be enemies
of organized society by making their living through lawbreaking. [For such crim-
inals probation is one] of the things the hardened criminal considers in computing
his percentage of successfully escaping the law.
United States v. Durkin, 63 F. Supp. 570, 573 (N.D. Ill. 1945), quoted approvingly in
United States v. Banks, 108 F. Supp. 14 (D. Minn. 1952).
15. [C~ontrol, after all, lies in the group pressure, the recognition and response secured
by lawful conduct rather than the direct fear of punishment. Not the fear of legal
penalties, as such, but the fear of loss of status in the group is the effective deter-
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Probation is probably the most flexible device available to a trial judge for
manipulating social influences.'0 The Federal Probation Act, for example,
authorizes a trial judge "when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best
interests of the public as well as the defendant will be served ... [to] place the
defendant on probation for such period ... and conditions as the court deems
best."' 7 Probation is designed to prevent future crime by releasing the con-
rent. But this is not really fear; what really occurs is that the person feels that do-
ing a specified thing in violation of the group standard, which also happens to be in
violation of the law, would not be in harmony with his personality, would lower
him. It does not occur to him to do such a thing. He would feel uncomfortable in
violating such a law .... This is the principal method of control whether the con-
duct is regulated by law or not.
SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 314 (6th ed. 1960); see also G.
MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SocIETY 152-64, 173-78 (1934); THOMAS, THE UNADJUSTED
GnL 41-44 (1925) ; TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY 7-9 (1938).
16. Probation is a process of treatment, prescribed by the court for persons convicted
of offenses against the law, during which the individual on probation lives in the
community and regulates his own life under conditions imposed by the court ... and
is subject to supervision by a probation officer.
3 U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
PENAL INSTITUTIONS, PROBATION, AND PAROLE 184 (1931) (Wickersham Report); see
also 2 U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 1-2 (1939).
Probation is a disposition by the court, usually in substitution for imprisonment, and in-
volves the suspension of either the imposition or execution of sentence. It is to be distin-
guished from parole which is a conditional release under supervision granted by an ad-
ministrative board after service of part of a term of imprisonment. The court may revoke
probation after a hearing for violation of conditions of probation, and imprison the pro-
bationer.
The statutory authority for probation in the federal courts is the Federal Probation
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1958) ; cf. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916) (holding
that there is no inherent power in federal courts to suspend sentence without statutory
authorization) ; see Note, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 311 (1959). To the extent that state proba-
tion systems may vary from the federal system, no attempt at a separate discussion is made
herein.
The wide discretion permitted the court in sentencing and in probation matters shifts
to that body many of the policy decisions previously made by the legislature in the form
of statutes assigning a fixed penalty to each crime. See Sellin, The Granting of Probation:
The Trial Judge's Dilemma, A Criminologist's View, in PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
100, 102 (S. Glueck ed. 1933).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1958). The leading case on the court's power over probation
holds that the act
confers an authority commensurate with its object ... [A]n exceptional degree of
flexibility in administration is essential. It is necessary to individualize each case,
to give that ... consideration to the particular situation of each offender which
would be possible only in the exercise of a broad discretion....
There is no suggestion in the statute that the scope of the discretion conferred
for the purpose of making the grant is narrowed in providing for its modification
or revocation. The authority for the later purpose ... is in terms equally broad ....
There are no limiting [procedural] requirements ... [or additional) criteria ....
Such procedural provisions as the Act contains harmonize with the view that
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victed individual into groups which expect non-criminal behavior.' 8 In at-
tempting to limit the groups into which a probationer is released, the court
may condition probation on changes in residence, job, or associates; it may
also require external conformity to standard behavior patterns such as attend-
ing church or living with one's family,' 9 and the supervision it makes available
may involve techniques such as psychological counseling and social casework.
20
Since existing probation law is too vague to provide adequate criteria for
the continuance of the probation, as well as the grant of it, rests in the court's dis-
cretion .... The broad authority of the court remains unimpaired.
Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220-21 (1932).
18. The cases often speak of probation as intended for the thoughtless young, so as to
give them a second chance, in the hope that they will reform, and so as to avoid the con-
tamination of prison; the conclusion is drawn that probation is not intended for the mature
or for those who have committed premeditated crime for profit. Cases are collected in
United States v. Banks, 108 F. Supp. 14 (D. Minn. 1952). The assumption underlying
this view is that some criminals have rationally adopted crime as a means of livelihood,
and that as to them deterrent punishment is the most effective treatment, while other
criminals are "immature" or "thoughtless," as to whom a free environment will be more
effective than a prison environment in inducing the decision to be law-abiding. This ap-
proach should be supplemented by the realization that non-rational factors influence the
commission of or abstention from even the most calculated crime, and that it is therefore
impossible to assume that probation supervision and environmental manipulation will be
ineffective in preventing the crimes of the "deliberate" criminal. See note 15 supra.
19. The standard conditions of federal probation are given in Federal Probation
Form 7:
(a) Refrain from the violation of any state and federal penal laws. (b) Live a
clean, honest, and temperate life. (c) Keep good company and good hours. (d) Keep
away from all undesirable places. (e) Work regularly. When out of work, notify
your probation officer at once. (f) Do not leave or remain away from the city or
town where you reside without permission of the probation officer. Notify your pro-
bation officer at once if you intend to change your address. (g) Contribute regularly
to the support of those for whose support you are legally responsible. (h) Follow
the probation officer's instructions and advice. The Probation Law gives him au-
thority to instruct and advise you regarding your recreational and social activities.
(i) Report promptly on the dates set forth. If for any unavoidable reason you are
unable to do so, communicate with your probation officer without delay.
These conditions may be given more specificity by the court or the probation officer. Ad-
ditional special conditions frequently concern reimbursement of stolen funds, change of
work or residence, or abstention from liquor. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1618(b) (7)
(1941) ; Doyle, Conditions of Probation: Their Imposition and Application, 17 FEDERAL
PROBATION no. 3, p. 18 (Sept. 1953) ; McBride & McClure, The Conditions of Probation,
29 CALIF. S.B.J. 44 (1954).
"[P]robation is designed to promote conventional behavior, the 'respectable' living of
middle class society." RUmNEY & MuRPHY, PROBATION AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT 89
(1952).
20. The probationer is under the supervision of a probation officer, who may return
the probationer to the court upon violation of a probation condition for an alteration of
conditions or for reimprisonment on the original charge for which convicted. For a survey
of the literature on the nature of probation officers' work, see Diana, What is Probation?,
51 J. CRix. L., C, & P.S. 189 (1960).
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evaluating exercises of judicial discretion, 21 this type of judicial decision is
peculiarly appropriate for analysis in terms of its "rationality."
United States v. Worcester 22 raises significant problems concerning the
permissible scope and rationality of trial court discretion in the administration
of probation. Thomas Worcester's engineering firm had participated in a well-
established and widespread system of corruption of state officials connected
with the award of public works contracts.2 3 As a result, Worcester was con-
victed of willful income tax evasion for deducting bribes as normal business
expenses ;24 no other participant in the corruption was indicted.2 Convinced
that Worcester was primarily "the victim of the criminal conduct" of venal
state officials, 26 the court granted probation on a condition requiring full and
candid testimony before all authorized investigations into the situation.27 Upon
the complaint of the United States Attorney that the probationer had violated
the conditions of probation by failing to cooperate fully with a federal grand
jury investigation, 28 Worcester was returned to court for a hearing on the
revocation of his probation. 29 The court decided to hold the revocation hearing
in public,30 to remove the restrictions of secrecy from the testimony given by
21. See note 17 supra; but see note 18 supra. Neither the reasons given by some of the
older cases for denying probation to the "hardened" criminal, nor statistical studies of re-
cidivism among probationers, can provide an adequate foundation for standards by which
to evaluate any specific probation order.
To the extent that a judicial decision is made by the application of clear, binding, and
comprehensive rules of law to clear facts, the decision may be analyzed in terms of its
fidelity to existing law. To the extent, however, that judicial "discretion" is permitted by
established law, the decision of a court can not adequately be evaluated in such terms.
Evaluation can be undertaken, though, in terms of the effectiveness of the action in achiev-
ing, at a minimum sacrifice of other social goals, the goal for which the judicial discretion
exists. Since the range of alternatives open to courts' discretion is restricted by certain
formal rules of law, however, an evaluation of judicial "rationality" must therefore first
involve a determination that the court's action is within the range of permissible options.
22. 190 F. Supp. 548 (D. Mass. 1961), application for prerogative writs denicd sub
nom. In re Callahan, 285 F.2d 757 (1st Cir. 1960).
23. 190 F. Supp. at 551-52, 574.
24. Id. at 552.
25. See id. at 574.
26. Id. at 552; see also id. at 572-74.
27. [H]e shall cooperate with, and give full, candid testimony to any national, state,
or local prosecutor, grand jury, petit jury, legislative body, legislative committee,
or authorized public agency of inquiry concerning any matter directly or indirectly
relevant to those matters covered in the trial....
Id. at 552-53. The standard conditions of probation were also applied to Worcester. See
note 19 mipra.
28. Id. at 553-54. Worcester gave testimony before a federal grand jury and before
the United States Attorney. It was the opinion of the United States Attorney that the
testimony was not full and candid and that Worcester had thereby violated the conditions
of his probation. Ibid.
29. Id. at 554.
30. Ibid. See also id. at 557-60.
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Worcester before the federal grand jury,31 and to call as witnesses persons
implicated by that testimony 32 in order to determine whether Worcester had
cooperated fully and candidly with investigations.3 3
The actions of the court in setting Worcester's probation conditions and in
holding revocation hearings in public 34 were attacked in motions 5 by "the
state's most powerful official," 36 who had been subpoenaed by the court to testify
at the revocation hearing.37 The court, in response to his criticism that the
proceedings were being used as vehicles for exposure, 38 admitted that exposure
was the "bona fide purpose"39 of the initial requirement of full and candid
testimony, but repeatedly declared that the revocation hearing was conducted
to resolve "the single issue [of] whether Worcester fulfilled the conditions of
his probation. 40
While the court did analyze both the probation condition and revocation
hearings in terms of the social costs they entail, it did not explicitly consider
their effectiveness as crime control devices. Both these analyses must be under-
taken in order to evaluate the "rationality" of the court's action.
31. Id. at 554.
32. The calling of witnesses was initiated by counsel for the probationer. Before the
key implicated witness was called by the court sua sponte, the witness had released to the
press a denial of the accuracy of Worcester's testimony and had then refused a court offer
to appear voluntarily. Id. at 554-56; see also id. at 560-62.
33. Id. at 554, 560, 561, 572.
34. Objections might be directed at the manner in which the hearings were conducted
rather than at the justifications for the court's decisions, see 190 F. Supp. at 561-62, but
evaluation of such objections is beyond the scope of this Note.
The court's manner was criticized by a member of the U.S. House of Representatives
who had been subpoenaed. 107 CONG. REc. 5927-28 (daily ed. April 19, 1961) (remarks of
Mr. Burke); compare id. at 5926-27 (remarks of Mr. McCormark, the Majority Leader);
id. at 5928-29 (remarks of Mr. Celler, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee).
35. Counsel for the witness moved (1) to quash the subpoena ad testificandum ad-
dressed to him, (2) to "cease, confine, stay" the hearing, (3) "to strike evidence" and (4)
"to strike or limit evidence." Id. at 551.
Counsel for witness also moved the Court of Appeals for leave to file petitions for writs
of mandamus and prohibition, in the same tenor as the motions below. 285 F.2d 757 (1st
Cir. 1960). The appellate court refused to interfere with ongoing proceedings and also
implied that witnesses such as the implicated official lacked standing to challenge them.
Ibid. The trial court subsequently denied the motions addressed to it, basing its holding
on the broad extent of its discretionary power over probation.
A motion before the court of appeals for a stay of the lower court's order to testify was
then made and denied without opinion. See letter from United States Attorney's Office,
District of Massachusetts, to The Yale Law Journal, May 9, 1961. (On file in Yale Law
Library).
36. Whipple, Dirly Mo1ney in Boston, 207 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 41, 42 (March 1961).
37. 190 F. Supp. at 555.
38. Counsel for the witness argued, in a phrase borrowed from the trial judge and
used for his own purposes, that the probationer was a red herring being used to catch a
whale. See id. at 550.
39. Id. at 569.
40. Id. at 572. See also id. at 554, 555, 560, 561.
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Worcester presents a situation where neither imprisonment nor more usual
probation techniques would have been as effective as the procedures chosen by
the court. Imprisonment is a dubious reformative treatment for a 64 year old
businessman 41 whose personal character was regarded by the court as "de-
cent"42 and who was found to be primarily a "victim of the criminal conduct
of others."'43 And whatever preventative value such isolation might have had
seems too small to justify the social cost involved in the sacrifice of Worcester's
abilities that imprisonment would entail. Moreover, the deterrent effect on
others of Worcester's fine or imprisonment would have been, at best, minimal;
Worcester was known to be a minor participant in a widespread crime net-
work who had come to the attention of the authorities because of circumstances
unrelated to the crime, while the leaders and other participants in the network
remained notoriously at liberty.44
To the extent that Worcester's criminal behavior stemmed from his mem-
bership in a subculture which regarded as legitimate what the state denomi-
nates criminal, normal probation procedures-which would have restored him
to such a social situation--could not have been expected to induce reform.45
And the type of corruption Worcester had participated in was sufficiently
widespread and well-established 46 to make reasonable the conclusion that the
people Worcester lived and worked among had apparently accepted the sys-
tem of bribery as normal, if not proper. Moreover, any attempt to impose
probation on conditions designed to transplant Worcester into a new segment
of society which might be expected to exercise positive influences appears im-
practical in light of the difficulties involved in attempting radically to reaccul-
turate an adult with settled personal and business roots.4 7
41. Whipple, Dirty Money in Boston, 207 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 41, 42 (March 1961).
42. 190 F. Supp. at 573. See also id. at 552, 572.
43. Id. at 552.
44. See id. at 574.
45. If the group with which the probationer identifies (whether his childhood family
or some later group) defines some crime to be a legitimate activity carrying no moral
stigma, then the probationer is likely to share this feeling and to regard the crime as only
another risky but profitable activity. See note 15 supra. As long as the probationer shares
the standards of his own subculture which conflict with the commands of the state, his
criminal propensities can be contained only through such influences (other than conscience)
as physical removal through execution or imprisonment, the threat of punishment, the
effect of the trial experience and the probation officer's personal relationship, and the effect
of economic self-interest.
It should be noted, however, that economic pressures of the group towards crime may
exist without the cultural-personality pressures discussed, and it is possible that Thomas
Worcester was located in a social situation such that graft existed as normal profit-taking,
though not necessarily regarded as fully legitimate.
46. See N.Y. Times, June 19, 1961, p. 1, col. 2; June 20, 1961, p. 1, col. 6; June 21,
1961, p. 1, col. 8; Whipple, Dirty Money in Boston, 207 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 41 (March
1961).
47. A shift in class may be more possible with youths than with the middle-aged, and
a major geographical and occupational shift may be more feasible with workers than with
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Several factors suggest that the probation measures in fact adopted by the
court might have been more effective in preventing Worcester's recidivism
than any of the available alternatives. The requirement that the probationer
give full cooperation to all future investigations would, by publicly labeling
him an informer, seem well calculated to discourage corrupt officials from
soliciting him to participate again in a system of bribery. Similarly, the possi-
bility of repeated public examination by the court of persons said to have taken
or transmitted Worcester's bribes 48 might well be effective in discouraging
criminal contacts with Worcester. Moreover, the official designation of Wor-
cester as a person cooperating with investigations, together with his subse-
quent association with authorities, may well have helped to reinforce his self-
image as a law-abiding person.49 And the subjection to judicial scrutiny of
other alleged participants, by demonstrating to the probationer that they were
not immune from state action, may have made easier his rejection of identifi-
cation with them and their values.50
Reformative measures concentrating on the individual's social context may
well be a prerequisite to a successful probation program when a criminal,
rather than engaging in "deviant" behavior, is an integrated member of a
deviant group to which he will return when released. 5' Action by those in-
stitutions equipped to deal with the criminal social situation in which Wor-
cester was enveloped may therefore have been desirable. Thus, the court's
requirement of full and candid testimony,52 the removal of secrecy restrictions
from that challenged testimony before the federal grand jury,5 3 the calling of
the implicated witnesses, 54 and the opinion at the close of the hearing,r 5 all
might have been calculated to focus the attention of other agencies on the
situation, a situation which had produced Worcester's crime and might well
again. The situation presented by Worcester was, of course, an extreme
executives. Even if such mobility were otherwise possible, however, the fact of conviction
might well-if known-make difficult the probationer's acceptance in the new group.
48. Worcester could be questioned at any time by prosecutors or other authorized in-
vestigators about such contracts; if his testimony was not considered full or candid he
could be brought before the court for another revocation hearing to which the newly im-
plicated or suspected persons could be summoned.
49. See Merton & Kittin, Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior,
in CONTINUITIES IN SOCIAL RESEARCH: STUDIES IN THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF "THE
AMERICAN SOLDIER" 86-95 (Merton & Lazersfeld ed. 1950); Erikson, The Problem of
Ego Identity, 4 J. Am. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 56-121 (1956).
50. See HINsIE & CAMPBELL, PsYcHIATRIC DICTIONARY 365-66 (3d ed. 1960) ; Erik-
son, Growth and Crises of the "Healthy Personality," in PERSONALITY IN NATURE, SoCIE-
TV, AND CULTURE 185-225 (Kluckholm ed. 1955).
51. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text. The actions taken by the court would
seem well calculated to prevent future criminal action, not only by Worcester, but also of
course by others similarly located.
52. Id. at 552-53.
53. Id. at 554.
54. Id. at 555-56. See note 30 supra.
55. Id. at 572-75.
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one; the devices employed in that case by the trial court need be utilized only
when the more usual measures of inter-agency communication prove ineffec-
tive in securing cooperation by other governmental bodies. 3 In Worcester it
seems that extraordinary measures were required to generate sufficient public
concern to compel official action; for when years of governmental inaction and
wide-spread local acceptance have established corruption as customary, 7 re-
form measures are unlikely to be initiated by an official community itself the
product of these traditions.
The court also weighed the costs of the infringement upon personal rights
to privacy resulting from the questioning of implicated witnesses at public
revocation hearings.58 But exposure, even when damage to reputations is like-
ly, is not outside the range of alternatives permissible in our legal system.
Thus, for example, holdings involving legislative investigations require only
that justification exist in terms of relevance to a legitimate object of inquiry ;9
the court in the instant case recognized such a limitation by scrupulously
restricting the questioning of implicated witnesses to the subject matter about
which Worcester had testified. 60 Moreover, the court attempted to safeguard
witnesses' interests by the extension to them of an unusual battery of privileges,
including the rights to have counsel and to call witnesses. 61 The court also
explored the argument that requiring Worcester to cooperate with investiga-
tions was an improper infringement on his right of immunity from state coer-
cion.62 It noted, however, that constitutionally valid immunity statutes 13 and
other precedents 64 demonstrate that coercion of testimony is not necessarily
an impermissible infringement on rights; and, in the instant case, after balanc-
56. Nor are governmental agencies the only mechanisms for such exposure; crime
commissions, bar associations, and newspapers perform a similar function. See Comment,
Methods of Investigating Municipal Corruption, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 717, 735-36 (1953);
190 F. Supp. at 570.
57. See note 46 supra.
58. 190 F. Supp. at 555, 557-62, 569-70.
59. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 214-15 (1959). The requirement of rele-
vancy to a question of legitimate legislative interest in a legislative hearing is much less
restricting than a requirement of relevancy to the legal issues in a court proceeding.
60. See 190 F. Supp. at 571-72. See also Whipple, Dirty Money in Boston, 207 AT-
LANTIC MONTHLY 41, 45 (March 1961).
61. The court stated repeatedly that witnesses might have counsel who would be al-
lowed to examine, cross-examine, subpoena witnesses, object, argue, file briefs, and ex-
amine a daily copy of the transcript. See 190 F. Supp. at 555; cf. Appendix showing rights
of witnesses before investigatory bodies, Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1961).
62. 190 F. Supp. at 563-68.
63. The court cites, at 190 F. Supp. at 568, The Immunity Act of 1954, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3486(c) (1958) and the immunity provisions of the Narcotics Control Act of 1956, 18
U.S.C. § 1406 (1958).
64. The court cites as precedent, 190 F. Supp. at 556, a holding that one already a
probationer may be required to give information on his criminal associates. Kaplan v.
United States, 234 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1956), noted, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 655; see also United
States v. Qualls, 182 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ill. 1960) ; cf. Reina v. United States, 364 U.S.
507 (1960) (similar requirement made of a prisoner rather than a probationer).
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ing the effects on Worcester against the usefulness of his testimony, the court
concluded that the probation condition was a reasonable one. 65
The Worcester court was also accused of usurping functions traditionally
assigned to prosecutors or grand juries 61 by granting Worcester his freedom
so as to aid other possible prosecutions ;17 it was argued that the choice of
cases to be prosecuted and the trading of a criminal's freedom for information
are customarily controlled by the prosecutor. 8 While the argument might be
made that this assignment of functions to the prosecutor rather than the court
is not only customary but also desirable in terms of political responsibility, the
very fact of the judge's political nonaccountability might well be regarded as
justifying the assignment to him of a regular supervisory role over prosecu-
torial discretion. Whether or not courts should generally function as super-
visory agencies over prosecutors, however, it is accepted that courts do have
some role in this area,69 and the actions of the Worcester court were very
limited. By first referring the probationer to grand juries, executive and legis-
lative bodies, 70 the court recognized their claims to control the initiation of
prosecutions. The court did not overrule any formal decision by a prosecuting
agency that investigations not be held: federal 71 investigations of the matter
were in progress, and the revocation hearings themselves were an outgrowth
of a grand jury hearing 72 and were initiated by the United States Attorney.73
The question may nevertheless arise as to the propriety of a judicial attempt
to implement an official though unenforced policy against corruption so as to
alter extensive and well-established local custom. Whether or not judicial ini-
65. That the conditions of probation were reasonable was an opinion, apparently shared
by Worcester and his counsel, who at no time during the proceeding challenged the terms
of probation. See 190 F. Supp. at 553.
66, See id. at 558.
67. See id. at 552-59.
68. See id. at 563.
69. See 42 Am. JUR. Prosecuting Attorneys, §§ 14, 16 (Supp. 1961), Annot., 155 A.L.R.
10 (1945).
For discussion of review of exercises of discretion within the crime control process,
see Note, 71 YALE L.J. 171, 176-77 (1961) ; J. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke
the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE
L.J. 543, 580-89 (1960) ; Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L.
REv. 427 (1960).
For discussion of the functioning of judges as commissions of inquiry and prosecution,
see SCIGLIANo, THE MICHIGAN ONE MAN GRAND JURY (1957); In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257 (1948) ; Scigliano, The Grand Jury, The Information, and The Judicial Inquiry, 38
ORE. L. REV. 303 (1959).
70. See note 27 supra.
71. 190 F. Supp. at 553; see letter from United States Attorney's Office, District of
Massachusetts, to The Yale Law Journal, May 9, 1961. (On file in Yale Law Library.)
Other Massachusetts public works corruption was subjected to state investigation. See
N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1960, p. 42, col. 3 (legislative investigation) ; id., col. 6 (state auditor);
id., Oct. 12, 1960, p. 29, col. 3 (grand jury).
72. 190 F. Supp. at 553.
73. Id. at 553-54.
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tiative is proper in such a case must be decided on the basis of such factors as
the importance of the policy implemented by the court, the magnitude of the
problem created by the existence of such customs, the likelihood of action by
the politically responsible governmental agencies should the court abstain from
action, the predictable effect of the court's action on the harmonious interaction
of the various agencies and levels of government, and the probability that the
judicial initiative will succeed in achieving the desired effect. Where, as in Wor-
cester, however, the public policy of condemning bribery is clear,74 the scope
of corruption is great,75 the inactivity of other governmental agencies is of
long standing,76 no official policies of state or federal governmental bodies are
contradicted, 77 and the initiative of the court is limited in scope,78 then the
court's action, on balance, seems to be justifiable.
Though observers may differ as to the particular weights assigned by the
Worcester court to competing goals, it appears that a thorough though inex-
plicit attempt was made, within the institutional and legal limits on judicial
discretion, 79 both to choose means of crime control on the basis of effectiveness
and to assess the costs of alternatives in terms of competing social goals. No
more can reasonably be required by the criterion of rationality.
74. Though illegal payments may be an "ordinary and necessary" business expense
otherwise deductible in computing federal income tax, such deductions will be disallowed
so as not to impair the state criminal policies against such payments. Boyle, Flagg & Sea-
man, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 43 (1955). See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). The use of federal tax statutes to enter the domain of state
criminal law, as in Worcester, raises problems of federalism worthy of further discussion.
See Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 139 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
75. See note 46 supra.
76. Ibid.
77. See notes 71-74 supra. Additional problems of federalism are involved, of course,
when a federal court takes the initiative in applying a national policy to alter a local cus-
tom. Cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). While this problem was
recognized by the Worcester court, 190 F. Supp. at 568, 570, discussion of it is beyond the
scope of this Note. See note 74 supra; see also Note, 71 YALE L.J. 344 (1961) ; Note, 71
YALE L.J. 537, 540 (1962).
78. The court, through exposure, invoked action by other agencies, rather than attempt
itself such acts as, for example, criminal contempt proceedings against implicated witnesses
who denied their involvement with Worcester when questioned by the Court. See 190 F.
Supp. at 569. Cf. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (Black, 3.) (Judge sitting as "one-
man grand jury" under state law may not take such contempt action in camera).
79. What shall be said of remedies which trial judges have newly evolved in equitable
suits founded on statutes? Novel remedies begin as permissible exercises of discre-
tion by courts of first instance. They win approval and imitation by similarly cir-
cumstanced courts.... Here is the common law at work.
WYZANsKI, A TRIAL JUDGE's FREEDOMS AND REsPONsIBrrY 25 (1952); see also United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347-48 (D. Mass. 1953) (Wy-
zanski, J.), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See generally Grinnel, Probation as an
Orthodox Common Law Practice in Massachusetts Prior to the Statutory System, 2 MAss.
L.Q. 591 (1916).
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